Knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies to new, emerging technologies by Heggedal, Tom-Reiel
This file was downloaded from BI Brage,  
the institutional repository (open access) at BI Norwegian Business School 
http://brage.bibsys.no/bi 
 
 
Knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies to new, emerging technologies 
 
Tom-Reiel Heggedal 
BI Norwegian Business School 
 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 24(2015)7:710-733 
 
 
This is the author’s accepted, refereed and final manuscript to the article  
DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2014.981004 
Publisher’s version available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2014.981004 
 
 
Copyright policy of Taylor & Francis, the publisher of this journal:   
'Green' Open Access = deposit of the Accepted Manuscript (after peer review but prior to 
publisher formatting) in a repository, with non-commercial reuse rights, with an Embargo 
period from date of publication of the final article. The embargo period for journals within the 
Social Sciences and the Humanities (SSH) is usually 18 months 
 
http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/copyright/Green-OA-AAM-embargo-periods.pdf 
 
Knowledge Spillovers and R&D Subsidies
to New, Emerging Technologies
Tom-Reiel Heggedal
Norwegian Business School, Oslo
Abstract
Is knowledge spillover a rationale for supporting R&D on new, emerging
technologies more than R&D on other technologies? In this paper I analyze
whether innovation externalities caused only by knowledge spillovers di¤er be-
tween technologies of di¤erent maturity. I show that R&D should not be sub-
sidized equally across industries when the knowledge stocks di¤er. This is
because knowledge spillovers depend on the size of the knowledge stock and the
elasticity of scale in R&D production. R&D in the emerging technology should
be subsidized more when the elasticity is smaller than one. However, R&D in
the mature technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is larger
than one.
JEL classication: O30; O31
Keywords: Innovation policy; Knowledge spillovers; Sector-specic R&D.
1 Introduction
Is knowledge spillover a rationale for supporting R&D on new, emerging technologies
more than R&D on other technologies? It is well known that the social benets
from R&D may be greater than the private benets from R&D as knowledge spills
across rms1 . These spillovers may be present in both emerging technologies and
other more mature technologies. Consequently, there is reason for governments to
support all R&D. However, policymakers and environmentalists often claim that
R&D in new technologies requires special attention. One recurring argument is that
new technologies need a pull or a push to get started since the social benet of
new knowledge is greater in new technologies than in old technologies. Nonetheless,
not much is known about the role of technology maturity in relation to knowledge
spillovers.
In this paper I analyze whether innovation externalities caused only by knowl-
edge spillovers di¤er between technologies of di¤erent maturity. The maturity of a
technology is dened here as the size of the knowledge stock. When a technology
is new, the accumulated knowledge stock in that technology is small compared to
other more mature technologies. I show that a di¤erence in accumulated knowledge,
ceteris paribus, is a rationale for di¤erentiated R&D support. The reason is that the
knowledge spillovers are related to the knowledge stocks.
Address: Norwegian Business School, 0042 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: Tom-Reiel.Heggedal@bi.no
Phone: (+47) 46410539
1See Griliches (1995), Klette et al. (2000), and Hall et al. (2010) for overviews.
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I develop a partial equilibrium model in the spirit of a Jones (1995)-type semi-
endogenous growth model. The model has two R&D industries which deliver patents
(ideas) in two di¤erent technologies: one emerging technology and one mature tech-
nology. The productivity of the R&D industries is increasing in the accumulated
knowledge stock in the respective technologies. On the balanced growth path the
model gives the standard result on scale e¤ects for semi-endogenous growth models,
i.e. subsidies to R&D do not inuence long-run growth rates. However, innovation
policy a¤ects the growth along a transition path and thus a¤ects the level of income
(production) on the balanced growth path (Jones and Williams, 2000). On the tran-
sition path towards the balanced growth path, R&D subsidies correct for the under-
supply of R&D from private rms. This correction speeds up the process of reaching
the balanced growth path and gives rise to income level e¤ects. Perez-Sebastian
(2007) shows that the long-run level e¤ects of innovation policies can be substantial
in a semi-endogenous growth model. The main focus in the paper presented here is
to study the relative undersupply of R&D in the two types of technology outside the
balanced growth path. This relative undersupply arising from the di¤erent maturity
of technologies is, to my knowledge, not studied much.
The reason maturity matters for optimal policy in this paper is that the pro-
duction of new ideas depends on the accumulated stock of knowledge. When the
knowledge stock increases the private rms get a productivity gain through improved
output of conducting R&D. Further, this productivity gain from new ideas is declin-
ing in the size of the knowledge stock, i.e. there are decreasing returns to new ideas
(Jones, 1995 and 1999). Since these spillovers to future R&D are external to private
rms, R&D activity should be subsidized. The size of the spillovers depends on both
how large the productivity gain from a new idea is and how many researchers take
advantage of that productivity gain, i.e. the level of R&D activity in future peri-
ods. R&D activity is higher in the mature technology due to lower costs, while the
productivity gain from a new idea is higher in the emerging technology. That the
spillovers are dependent on the knowledge stocks implies that R&D subsidies to the
two technologies should not be equal.
In this paper the growth rates of the knowledge stocks determine whether the
emerging technology or the mature technology is more undersupplied in the market
equilibrium. R&D in the technology that grows faster should be subsidized more
since the knowledge spillovers are larger in that technology. The reason is that the
spillovers and the growth rates of the knowledge stocks are determined by the same
two opposing e¤ects. First, both the growth rate and the spillovers in a technology
are increasing in the knowledge stock because the labor productivity is high when
the knowledge stock is large. Second, both the growth rate and the spillovers in a
technology are declining in the knowledge stock because there is less productivity
gain from new patents when the knowledge stock is large. The relative strength of
the two opposing e¤ects determines whether the growth rate in the mature or the
emerging technology is greater.
1.1 Related literature
Low carbon emission technologies like solar power, carbon capture and sequestra-
tion, and hydrogen cars are typically new, emerging technologies. There is recent
literature on R&D subsidies directed to clean, new technologies versus dirty, mature
technologies. In particular, Acemoglu et al. (2012) analyze R&D subsidies in a model
with clean and dirty technologies where the clean technology has the smaller knowl-
edge stock, i.e. the clean technology is less mature. They nd that it is optimal to
support clean innovation more than dirty. However, the reason is that the subsidy
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to clean technologies is used to deal with future environmental externalities. In other
words, it is not di¤erences in innovation externalities that drive the main result in
Acemoglu et at. (2012). In the paper presented here, innovation externalities are
analyzed in isolation of all other potential market failures, i.e. there are no environ-
mental, or other, externalities. Thus, the only di¤erence between the technologies
stems from di¤erences in the knowledge stocks. This keeps the analysis focused
on whether knowledge spillovers are a rationale for di¤erentiated R&D support to
technologies of di¤erent maturity.
Gerlagh et al. (2009 and 2011) also study the maturity of clean technologies and
public R&D support. They nd that the optimal subsidy to a maturing technology
falls over time. However, they nd this in a model with one technology sector and
thus lack the relative consideration of the undersupply between emerging and mature
technologies. Further, their nding comes as a result of ine¢ ciencies in the R&D
market related to limited patent lifetime. R&D is biased towards technologies that
pay back within the patent lifetime. Hence, subsidies should be larger in early periods
because patent lifetime is limited, not because the technology is less developed in the
beginning, i.e. a small initial knowledge stock, which is the case in this paper.
How di¤erent types of technology can be undersupplied in the market is analyzed
by Hart (2008). Rather than looking at public support for technology investment,
he implements optimal second-best carbon taxes. These taxes may be higher than
the Pigouvian level in order to encourage investment in emissions-saving technology
at the expense of general production technology. The reason is that the emissions-
saving technology may be relatively more undersupplied than the other technology.
However, this result is derived from an increased scarcity of the environmental good
through a rising shadow price of emissions rather than the maturity of technology,
which is the sole cause of the relative undersupply of technology in this paper.
In another study, Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007) nd that newly adopted tech-
nologies should be subsidized more than older technologies. Their technology exter-
nalities, however, come from learning e¤ects, as opposed to R&D externalities in
this paper. In their model the learning e¤ects are strongest for newly adopted tech-
nologies so they have higher spillovers than older technologies. Hence, the optimal
subsidies decrease over time as the learning e¤ects diminish.
R&D externalities and subsidies to clean technologies are studied in Heggedal
and Jacobsen (2011). They nd that the R&D subsidies should fall over time since
spillovers are larger in early periods due to decreasing returns to new ideas. However,
they only study subsidies to R&D in one type of technology and do not analyze the
relative undersupply of R&D in technologies with di¤erent maturity.
In the economic growth literature there are several papers that study innovation
in multi-sector R&D models with symmetric equilibria (e.g. Smulders and van de
Klundert, 1995 and 1997; Young, 1998; Segerstrom, 2000; Li, 2000 and 2002; Peretto
and Smulders, 2002). However, the symmetric equilibria in the respective types of
innovation sectors, variant expansion and/or quality improvement, imply that the
papers do not study the consequences of di¤erences in R&D productivity between
rms in the same innovation sector. Nonetheless, these models may imply di¤erences
in R&D productivity between rms in di¤erent sectors. For example, Strulik (2007)
shows that optimal R&D subsidies di¤er between rms in the quality improvement
sector and rms in the variant expansion sector. There are several other papers with
multi-sector R&D models that have asymmetric equilibria in the innovation sectors
(e.g. Acemoglu, 2002; Smulders and Nooij, 2003; Grimaud and Rouge, 2008; Chu,
2011; Mosel, 2010). However, these papers do not study the implication that the
di¤erent maturity of technologies has for the allocation of resources between R&D
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industries.
Two papers with multi-sector R&D models that specically take the maturity
of technologies into account are Doi and Mino (2005) and Reis and Traca (2008)2 .
Doi and Mino (2005) investigate equilibrium dynamics in a model of endogenous
technological change with two R&D industries. They nd that the relative size of the
knowledge stocks matters for the allocation of resources to production of consumer
goods and production of R&D. Reis and Traca (2008) analyze the implication of
a leading and a laggard technology for long run growth in a model with quality
improvement3 . They nd that intersectoral spillovers may prevent a monopolization
of the market by the productivity leader and thus prevent a stagnation of growth.
Neither Reis and Traca (2008) nor Doi and Mino (2005) account for decreasing returns
to new ideas which is done in this paper. Further, both studies only investigate
the market equilibrium and do not explore the connection between spillovers, the
maturity of technologies and optimal policies.
The paper is organized as follows. An illustration of the core mechanism in the
model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 sets up the model and solves for both
the private market equilibrium and the socially optimal equilibrium. The relative
undersupply of the technologies is analyzed in Section 4. Numerical simulations with
extensions of the model are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes and
o¤ers a discussion of the results.
2 Illustration
One reason why R&D in emerging and mature technologies may not be equally
undersupplied is that a typical patent production function is concave in the amount
of previous patents (ideas). A functional form often used in growth models is
_A = LA : 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1; (1)
where _A is the production of new patents, L is labor input,  is an exogenous tech-
nology factor,  is the output elasticity with respect to labor,  is the output elas-
ticity with respect to patents, i.e. the spillover parameter, and A is stock of patents
accumulated from previous periods, i.e. the knowledge stock. The spillover parame-
ter reects the e¤ect of the existing knowledge stock on the production of patents.
A spillover parameter below one is supported by both theoretical studies (see e.g.
dAspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Jones, 1995 and 1999; De Bondt, 1997) and em-
pirical ndings (see e.g. Jones and Williams, 2000; Popp, 2002; Bottazzi and Peri,
2003; Gong et al., 2004). With a parameter below one, the model exhibits weak
scale e¤ects and the long-run growth rate of patents is dependent on the population
growth rate, which are the main characteristics of semi-endogenous growth models
(Jones, 2005). The patent productivity is increasing in the knowledge stock in the
following way:
@ _A
@A
= LA 1 > 0: (2)
This productivity gain is the source of the spillover e¤ect. Patents from previous
periods lower the cost of producing new patents. The ultimate reason is that ideas
are non-rival goods, in the sense that one entitys use of an idea does not diminish
2Although few papers, to my knowledge, investigate the consequences of di¤erent maturity for
R&D policy in closed economies, there are several studies of cross-country di¤erences in technological
development. Many of these studies focus on the distance to the technology frontier and di¤erences
in growth rates and income. See for example Aghion and Howitt (2006) and Madsen (2008).
3See for example Aghion et al. (2001) for more references on other leader and laggard quality
improvement models.
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the benet for other entitiessimultaneous use. Patent protection rights may give
excludability for products based on new ideas. However, this does not prevent others
from using that idea to create new ideas, i.e. "standing on the shoulders of giants".
This spillover from the production of a patent to all rms that produce patents in
later periods is not accounted for by the individual rms, i.e. it is an externality.
The spillovers imply that the rms undersupply patent production to the market,
and a policymaker should try to correct for this, e.g. by subsidizing R&D.
From (2) it is clear that patents in a mature technology can be produced with
less resources than in an emerging technology, where maturity is dened by the size
of A. Ceteris paribus, the mature technology will be allocated more labor than the
emerging technology both in the private and the social (optimal) equilibrium. The
amount of labor input in future periodspatent production inuences the spillovers
from current period production in the following way:
@ ln(@
_A
@A )
@ lnL
=  > 0: (3)
In a future period with high R&D production, the benets are greater from an
increase in the stock of ideas because it lowers costs for a larger production set. In
other words, the benets are greater when a new patent spills over to more R&D
rms and researchers. I nd it convenient to name this e¤ect expressed by  the
spillover size e¤ect. This e¤ect means that the spillovers are larger in the mature
technology than in the emerging technology, which implies that R&D in the mature
technology should be subsidized more.
On the other hand, the change in patent productivity is smaller when the knowl-
edge stock is larger:
@ ln(@
_A
@A )
@ lnA
= (  1) < 0: (4)
The reason is that when a new patent is added to a large set of other patents this
does not increase the R&D opportunities in future periods as much as an additional
patent when there are few other patents. Thus, a new patent in an emerging tech-
nology sector provides a greater productivity increase than a new patent in a mature
technology. I nd it convenient to name this e¤ect expressed by    1 the spillover
depletion e¤ect, which implies that R&D in the emerging technology should be sub-
sidized more. The relative undersupply of R&D in the two technologies depends on
whether the spillover size e¤ect or the spillover depletion e¤ect dominates.
An example of technologies where the spillover e¤ects may be present is con-
ventional cars with internal combustion engines and hydrogen cars with fuel cells
as the energy conversion system. A lot of research has been carried out on internal
combustion engines compared to fuel cells for cars. The implied large knowledge
stock for internal combustion engines means that there are many ideas to build on
and that new ideas can be found in many dimensions. When the R&D activity in
internal combustion technology is high, a new idea may benet many researchers in
future periods, i.e. the spillover size e¤ect is large. However, decreasing returns to
new ideas are present. Decreasing returns do not mean that the best ideas get taken
rst (i.e. no shing out), but that the benet for future R&D is relatively small from
a new idea when it is just one more idea in an already large pool of knowledge. In
the fuel cell technology, the benet for researchers from a new idea may be greater
than in the internal combustion technology. The reason is that a new idea expands
the future research possibilities relatively more when the knowledge stock is small,
i.e. the spillover depletion e¤ect is smaller in the immature technology.
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3 The model
In order to analyze the relative undersupply of R&D in an emerging technology
compared to R&D in a mature technology, I develop a partial equilibrium model with
nal goods producers, intermediate goods producers, and patents (ideas) producers.
The nal goods industry manufactures output (e.g. transportation services) and
is characterized by productivity increase from an expansion of the number of available
capital varieties (Romer, 1990). In the intermediate goods industry, rms buy patents
from one of the R&D industries. A patent gives a rm an exclusive right to produce
one type of capital variety. The intermediate goods rms engage in monopolistic
competition and deliver capital varieties to the manufacturer. There are two R&D
industries, one emerging and one mature. These R&D industries produce new patents
in their respective technology eld: small scale emerging technology (e.g. hydrogen-
based car engines) and large scale mature technology (e.g. internal combustion car
engines). The accumulated production of patents gives rise to two di¤erent knowledge
stocks, which lower the cost of patent production in the respective technologies. The
maturity of a technology is dened by the amount of patents in the technology, i.e.
the size of the knowledge stock.
The reason I employ a model with two R&D industries instead of using a model
with only one R&D industry is that analyzing how optimal subsidies rise and fall
along the transition path proves to be di¢ cult. Rather than analyzing the optimal
subsidies directly, I analyze the relative undersupply of R&D from two industries
along the transition path in order to obtain analytically tractable results.
I make two major assumptions in order to focus on the role of maturity in the
allocation of resources to R&D in di¤erent technologies. First, I assume that it does
not matter for the nal goods industry whether capital variants are produced by
one technology or the other. The nal goods industry gets the same productivity
increase from a capital variant based on the emerging technology as one based on the
mature technology. By making this assumption I manage to isolate the e¤ect that the
maturity of the technologies, through the knowledge stocks, has on the investment
decision in the R&D industries.
The role of maturity could be studied in a more elaborate model where it would
matter for the nal goods production which of the two technologies are used. This
would add a market size and a price (quality) e¤ect on the demand side of the market
(see Acemoglu, 2002, and Acemoglu et al., 2012). These e¤ects would clearly matter
for the allocation of R&D. However, whether they would matter for optimal R&D
policy is less clear as the market size and price e¤ect, at least in part, would be ap-
propriated by the private rms. If other asymmetric market failures than knowledge
spillovers were included in the analysis, these should be targeted by separate policies.
For instance if there are emission externalities on the use of the mature technology,
the optimal policy would be to set the Pigouvian tax. In this case, the environmental
e¤ect is taken care of and we are left with the question: Is there still a rationale for
di¤erentiated R&D support? The focus of this paper is to analyze the knowledge
externality on the supply side of the market in isolation without being confounded
by other e¤ects. See Section 6 for a further discussion of demand side e¤ects and
knowledge spillovers.
The second major assumption is that the total allocation of resources dedicated
to R&D is given. I disregard the allocation between nal goods production and
patent production since the focus of this paper is on the relative undersupply of the
two technologies. In general, R&D is undersupplied by private rms in the model
presented here, and subsidies should be given to internalize knowledge spillovers. The
6
undersupply of R&D depends on the di¤erence between the social and the private
rates of return from R&D, where the rates of return give the social and private
allocation of resources. However, in this paper I do not study the undersupply of
R&D per se, but the di¤erence in the social and the private allocation between the two
technologies. Both technologies are undersupplied, but the question I raise is whether
one is more undersupplied than the other. If one technology is more undersupplied
then R&D in that technology should be subsidized more than R&D in the other.
3.1 The private market equilibrium
In the private market equilibrium private rms maximize prots without taking into
account the externalities arising from knowledge spillovers. In this section I derive
the market allocation of resources to the two R&D industries.
3.1.1 Final goods industry
The nal goods industry manufactures output with the following production function:
Yt = L
1 
Y;t
Z At
0
xi;tdi :  2 (0; 1); (5)
where LY;t is labor input, xt;i is input of capital variant i, and At is total knowledge
stock. The total knowledge stock is given by At = Ae;t+Am;t, where Ae;t is knowledge
stock in the emerging technology, e, and Am;t is knowledge stock in the mature
technology, m. The knowledge stocks represent the amount of patents available.
More patents correspond to more capital variants and increased productivity. Time,
t , is suppressed in the rest of the paper where not otherwise noted. Y is sold for a
numeraire price equal to 1.
A representative rm hires labor at rate wY and buys capital variants at price pi,
takes prices as given, and solves
max
LY ;xi
: L1 Y
Z A
0
xi di  wY LY  
Z A
0
pixidi.
The maximization problem gives the following rst order conditions:
Ly = (1  ) Y
wY
(6)
xi = (

pi
)
1
(1 )
(1  )Y
wY
: _i; (7)
where I have substituted back for Y from (5). Equation (6) gives the demand for
labor in the nal goods industry and (7) gives the demand for capital variant i.
3.1.2 Intermediate goods industry
Firms in the intermediate goods industry buy one patent each from one of the R&D
industries. The patent is a xed cost for the rm and gives an exclusive right to
produce a capital variant based on that patent. They transform capital goods into
intermediate goods in a one to one ratio and sell to the nal goods industry under mo-
nopolistic competition. The production technology (or rather the capital-conversion)
is the same for all intermediate rms. There is free entry into this industry in the
sense that anyone can bid for a patent and produce a capital variety. An intermediate
goods rm solves the following problem:
max
xi
: p(xi)xi   rxi;
7
where r is interest rate on capital, i.e. cost of production, and p(xi) is the inverse
demand for capital variety i from the nal goods sector. The rst order condition is
@pi
@xi
xi
pi
+ 1 =
r
pi
; (8)
where @pi@xi
xi
pi
is equal to the negative inverse price elasticity from equation (7),  1.
The price elasticity is equal for all capital variants. Thus the price for the variants
is equal for all i, pi = p = r , where
1
 can be interpreted as a markup factor.
The equal price together with demand from equation (7) implies that the demands
for all capital variants are equal, xi = x, and that the instantaneous prot  is the
same for all the intermediate goods rms:
 = px  rx = (1  )px. (9)
The instantaneous prot for all intermediate goods rms is the same since they have
the same marginal costs and face the same elasticity of demand for their products.
3.1.3 R&D industries
There are two industries producing patents, one in the emerging technology, e , and
one in the mature technology, m. The production of patents from the rms is given
by the following production function:
_Aj = jLj = L

jA

j : j = e;m : 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1; (10)
where j = L
 1
j A

j is the average productivity. The R&D rms take the average
productivity as given. However, productivity changes over time as the current period
patent production contributes to the knowledge stock. Further, productivity within
a time period depends on the R&D activity due to the stepping on toes e¤ect (Jones
and Williams, 2000). When more researchers pursue new ideas, duplication increases
and average productivity declines.
The only di¤erence between producing patents in the two technologies follows
from the knowledge stocks. The initial knowledge stock is smaller in the emerging
technology than in the mature technology, i.e. Ae;0 < Am;0. Note that there are
no inter-industry knowledge spillovers in the model. In Section 5  the numerical
simulations part of the paper the model is extended to allow for spillovers between
the industries as well as di¤erences in the spillover parameters.
There is free entry into the R&D industries. A representative rm solves
max
Lj
: PjjLj   wALj : j = e;m;
taking the price of the patents Pj and the wage rate wA as given. The maximization
problem gives the following rst order condition in the two industries:
Pjj = wA : j = e;m
,
PjL
 1
j A

j = wA : j = e;m;
(11)
where I have used j = L
 1
j A

j . The rst order condition gives the resource
allocation to R&D in the emerging and the mature technology. This condition can
be interpreted as a free entry condition as rms establish in both industries until
revenue equates costs: PjL
 1
j A

j = wA , PjLjAj = wALj , Pj _Aj = wALj .
8
That the intermediate goods rms have the same prots whichever technology
they supply to the nal goods industry implies that the price of a patent is equal in
the two technologies, i.e. Pe = Pm = P (see Appendix A). The equality of patent
prices implies that the only source of di¤erence in the production of ideas between
the two R&D industries emanates from the knowledge stocks. The di¤erence in
knowledge stocks leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Labor allocation and patent production are always higher in the ma-
ture R&D industry than in the emerging R&D industry in the private market equi-
librium.
Proof. Rearranging (11) gives Lj = (
PAj
wA
)
1
1  . Then, Am > Ae ) Lm > Le , since
 > 0 and  < 1. This together with (10) gives _Am > _Ae.
Proposition 1 follows from the mature technology having a larger knowledge stock
than the emerging. A larger knowledge stock implies higher patent productivity for
given output elasticities. Since factors other than productivity, i.e. patent price and
wage rate, are equal in the two R&D industries, rms always invest more in the
mature R&D industry.
The labor allocation is larger to the mature than to the emerging R&D industry,
but which growth rate is larger depends on the sum of the output elasticity parameters
 and , i.e. the elasticity of scale. The relationship between the output elasticities
and the growth rates of the knowledge stocks is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In the private market equilibrium, the emerging technology grows
faster (slower) than the mature technology if + is smaller (larger) than one, while
the technologies grow at the same rates if +  is equal to one.
Proof. The growth rate is given by
_Aj
Aj
= LjA
 1
j . This together with (11) give
_Aj
Aj
= kA
+ 1
1 
j ,where k = v(
wA
Pv )

 1 . Since Am > Ae, it follows that
_Ae
Ae
>
_Am
Am
when
+  < 1,
_Ae
Ae
<
_Am
Am
when +  > 1, and
_Ae
Ae
=
_Am
Am
when +  = 1.
Proposition 2 states that whether the growth rates are increasing or decreasing
in the knowledge stocks follows from the scale elasticity. There are two opposing
e¤ects from a larger knowledge stock on the growth rate. First, the labor input
grows as productivity improves. This gives that the growth rate is increasing in the
knowledge stock, i.e. the spillover size e¤ect. Second, there is less productivity gain
from new patents when the knowledge stock is large. This gives that the growth rate
is decreasing in the knowledge stock, i.e. the spillover depletion e¤ect. The scale
elasticity determines the dominating e¤ect.
Total labor dedicated to R&D in the economy LA is given by assumption, i.e.
LA = Le + Lm. This assumption can be understood as a division of the labor force
into two separate markets; one market for R&D with a highly specialized workforce
and one for other activities, LY . The assumption implies that when one type of R&D
increases, e.g. from a subsidy, the other type of R&D is crowded out. In order to
compare the market allocation with the socially optimal allocation, which is derived
in the next section, I normalize LA to one and dene the allocation ratio between the
two technologies 1 LmLm . From (11) we have that the values of the marginal products
in the mature and the emerging R&D industry equate in equilibrium:
P(Lpm)
 1Am = P(1  Lpm) 1Ae
,
1 Lpm
Lpm
= ( AeAm )

1  ;
(12)
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where Lpm is the labor allocation to the mature R&D industry in the market equilib-
rium4 . We see that the private market allocation ratio between the two technologies,
1 Lpm
Lpm
, is given by the knowledge stock ratio, AeAm
5 .
The allocation ratio in equation (12) reproduces Proposition 1. This allocation
ratio highlights that it is only the maturity of the technologies that matters for the
private rmsallocation of labor between the two technologies.
3.2 The socially optimal equilibrium
In this section I solve a simplied social planner problem to nd the socially optimal
(e¢ cient) allocation of labor between the mature and the emerging R&D industries.
The social planner maximizes output over the time period by allocating la-
bor between the two R&D industries. Final goods production is given by Yt =
L1 Y;t
R At
0
xtidi and total capital is given by
R At
0
xtdt = Kt. The symmetry of capital
goods implies that xi = KA and the nal goods production function can be written
Y = A1 KL1 Y . The labor allocation to nal goods production is given by as-
sumption. Thus, maximizing output is equivalent to maximizing the total knowledge
stock.
The social planners problem is then
max
Lm
:
Z 1
0
(Am +Ae)e
 rtdt : Lm 2 (0; 1)
s:t: _Am = vL

mA

m
_Ae = v(1  Lm)Ae ;
given the initial stocks of knowledge Am;0 and Ae;0, and the discount rate r, i.e. the
interest rate. The rst order condition gives the social allocation ratio between the
two R&D industries (see Appendix B):
1  Lm
Lm
=
e _Ae
m _Am
; (13)
where Lm is the socially optimal allocation of labor to R&D in the mature technology,
m is the shadow value of patents in the mature technology, and e is the shadow
value of patents in the emerging technology6 . As in the private market equilibrium
equation (13) implies that the value of the marginal products equates in equilibrium.
The social allocation ratio can be rewritten:
1  Lm
Lm
= (
e
m
)1=(1 )(
Ae
Am
)=(1 ): (14)
In the social optimum, the allocation ratio is dependent on the relative shadow values
of patents in addition to the knowledge stocks. The allocation of labor to the emerging
technology can only be larger than that to the mature technology if the shadow value
is larger in the emerging technology, since the knowledge stock is larger in the mature
technology on a transition path.
4The externality from the duplication e¤ect does not matter for the allocation ratio between the
R&D industries. If the rms account for duplication e¤orts, the rst order condition is given by
PjL
 1
j A

j = wA, which gives the same allocation ratio as in the main text.
5There is no investment in the emerging technology if there are constant returns to labor,  = 1
(i.e. no stepping on toes), since the marginal product of labor in R&D production is always greater
for the mature technology in this case.
6This simple, partial maximization problem gives the same allocation rule between the two R&D
industries as a full social planner problem where the resource allocation between nal goods and
R&D production is not given, see Appendix C.
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4 The relative undersupply of the technologies
The relative undersupply of R&D in the two technologies is found by comparing the
private allocation of labor with the social allocation. By combining equation (12)
with equation (14) it is clear that the di¤erence between the private and the social
allocations follows the shadow values:
(1  Lm)=Lm
(1  Lpm)=Lpm = (
e
m
)1=(1 ): (15)
In the market equilibrium, the maturity of the technologies matters for the allocation
of labor because this inuences the productivity in the R&D industries. In the social
equilibrium, the maturity of the technologies has an additional intertemporal e¤ect
because the maturity also matters for the spillovers that reduce costs of producing
patents in later periods. The following proposition states the relationship between
the shadow values and the relative allocation of labor in the private and the social
equilibrium:
Proposition 3 If the shadow values of patents equate, m = e, the private market
allocation is the same as the socially e¢ cient allocation. However, if the shadow
value of patents is larger for one of the technologies, the private market equilibrium
undersupplies R&D in that technology more than R&D in the other technology.
When the market equilibrium undersupplies one type of R&D more, it is socially
e¢ cient to subsidize that type of R&D more. This social e¢ ciency argument is stated
in the following corollary:
Corollary 4 If the shadow value of patents is larger for one of the technologies, the
government should subsidize R&D in that technology more than R&D in the other
technology.
4.1 Which technology is more undersupplied?
In this section I calculate expressions for the shadow values and derive the condition
that determines which of the two technologies is more undersupplied in the private
market equilibrium.
The evaluation of the shadow values follows from the co-state equations (see
Appendix B):
_j = jr   j
_Aj
Aj
  1 : j = m; e: (16)
Together with the transversality conditions, (16) can be solved to nd the expressions
for the shadow values (see Appendix D for calculations):
j = A
 
j e
rt
Z 1
t
[Aj(z)]
e rzdz : j = m; e: (17)
From (17) we see that a shadow value is a function of the current knowledge stock
and the discounted knowledge stocks of all future periods.
On a balanced growth path the shadow values of patents are equal in the two
technologies (see Appendix D). Hence, R&D subsidies should not be diversied on
a balanced growth path. In a semi-endogenous growth model like the one presented
in this paper it is a well-known result that subsidies to R&D do not a¤ect the long
run-growth rate. However, subsides do a¤ect the growth rates along the transition
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path and, thus, a¤ect the long-run level of patents and income (Jones, 1999). When
the economy starts o¤ with di¤erent knowledge stocks in the two technologies the
economy is on a transition path, and along this path the shadow values may vary.
The relative shadow value of patents is given by
e
m
=
A e
R1
t
[Ae(z)]
e rzdz
A m
R1
t
[Am(z)]e rzdz
: (18)
Equation (18) implies that the shadow value is greater in whichever technology the
knowledge stock grows faster in the social optimum. The next natural step would
be to analyze the di¤erence in these growth rates on the transition path. However,
such an analysis proves to be di¢ cult due to the complexity of the dynamic system.
Instead I show which technology is more undersupplied by analyzing the e¤ect on
the Hamiltonian of deviating from the allocation ratio in the market equilibrium.
Consider the admissible solution [Ae; Am; Lpm] to the planners maximization
problem, where we can think of Lpm as a constrained maximum for the planner. If the
constrained maximum is implemented in each period, we can calculate the knowledge
stocks and the shadow values by using the solutions from the market equilibrium.
By analyzing perturbations of Lpm along this path, I show in Appendix E that which
technology is more undersupplied in the private market allocation is given by
A m
R1
t
[Am(z)]
e rzdz
A e
R1
t
[Ae(z)]e rzdz
  1 ? 0: (19)
If the left hand side of (19) is negative (positive), then the social allocation to the
emerging R&D industry is larger (smaller) than the private market allocation. Fur-
ther, the sign of the left hand side of (19) depends on the growth rates of the knowl-
edge stocks in the market equilibrium. This relationship between the growth rates
and the undersupply leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The emerging technology is more (less) undersupplied than the ma-
ture technology if the growth rate of Ae is larger (smaller) than the growth rate of
Am in the private market equilibrium.
Proof. sign[A
 
m
R1
t
[Am(z)]
e rzdz
A e
R1
t
[Ae(z)]e rzdz
 1] = sign[
R1
t
(
Am(z)
Am(t)
)e rzdzR1
t
(
Ae(z)
Ae(t)
)e rzdz
 1] which is negative
(positive) if
_Ae
Ae
is larger (smaller) than
_Am
Am
. In the constrained maximum the growth
rates of Ae and Am follow from Lpm.
Proposition 5 states that the technology that grows faster in the private equilib-
rium is more undersupplied. The reason is that the knowledge spillovers are larger in
the technology with the higher growth rate. The spillovers and the growth rates of
the knowledge stocks are determined by the same opposing e¤ects: the spillover size
e¤ect and the spillover depletion e¤ect. First, both the growth rate and the spillovers
in a technology are increasing in the knowledge stock because the labor input is large
due to high labor productivity when the knowledge stock is large. Second, both the
growth rate and the spillovers in a technology are declining in the knowledge stock
because there is less productivity gain from new patents when the knowledge stock
is large. Whether the technology with the small knowledge stock or the technology
with the large knowledge stock grows faster is determined by the relative strength of
the two opposing spillover e¤ects.
Further, from Proposition 2 we have that the growth rates of the knowledge
stocks in the market equilibrium depend on the output elasticity parameters  and
. Proposition 2 together with Proposition 5 lead to the following corollary:
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Corollary 6 The emerging technology is more (less) undersupplied than the mature
technology on a transition path if +  is smaller (larger) than one.
Corollary 6 states that the relative undersupply of the technologies is determined
by the elasticity of scale. The reason is that the elasticity of scale determines the
growth rates of the knowledge stocks in the private equilibrium. When  > 1   
the spillover size e¤ect is larger than the spillover depletion e¤ect and the market
outcome gives a larger undersupply of the mature technology compared with the
emerging technology. In this case it is optimal to subsidize the mature R&D industry
more than the emerging R&D industry. When  < 1  the spillover depletion e¤ect
dominates and it is optimal to subsidize the emerging R&D industry more than the
mature R&D industry.
5 Extensions with numerical simulations
In this section I use numerical simulations to analyze extensions to the baseline
model. First I run the baseline model and show to what degree the elasticity of scale
determines the di¤erence between the social and the private allocation to the two
R&D industries. Then I show the e¤ect of including knowledge spillovers between
R&D industries. Last I show the e¤ect of letting the spillover parameter di¤er across
the industries.
5.1 Numerical procedure
The simulation model is programmed as a discrete time model over 150 periods. I
assume that patents produced in one time period are not included in the current
periods knowledge stock. Knowledge accumulates according to Aj;t+1 = Aj;t +
vLj;tA

j;t : j = m; e. The initial knowledge stocks are arbitrarily chosen so that
Am;0 > Ae;0. Total resources devoted to R&D are given; 1 = Le + Lm. The model
solves the rmsmaximization problem by setting Lpm in each period. Further, the
model solves the social planners maximization problem by setting Lm for all periods
simultaneously.
5.2 The baseline model
The di¤erence between the social and the private allocation of labor to the mature
R&D industry Lm Lpm for di¤erent parameter values is given in Figures 1a and 1b:
Figure 1a: Figure 1b
Figure 1a shows the di¤erence between the allocations when +  > 1, while Figure
1b shows the di¤erence when +  < 1. Time periods are on the horizontal axis. A
positive (negative) number on the vertical axis indicates that the mature (emerging)
industry should be subsidized more in that time period. Corollary 6 is reproduced in
all simulations. The elasticity of scale determines whether the social or the private
allocation to the mature R&D industry is larger; Lm Lpm is positive when + > 1,
and Lm   Lpm is negative when +  < 1. Further, we see that the social allocation
approaches the private allocation in the long run.
The elasticity of scale determines which of the two technologies is more undersup-
plied. However, when the elasticity parameters are low we see from Figure 1b that
the di¤erence between the social and the private allocation is small. The reason is
that the knowledge spillovers are smaller when the elasticities are low. This small dif-
ference in spillovers might indicate that there is no case for subsidizing the emerging
R&D industry more than the mature when we account for potential costs of admin-
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istrating a di¤erentiated R&D policy, e.g. costs of determining which technology is
emerging and which is mature.
Note that the initial knowledge stocks are arbitrarily chosen in the model simu-
lations. Di¤erent choices of initial knowledge stocks that either change the relative
size of the stocks or only their absolute sizes do not change the main result. Further,
the interest (discount) rate is also arbitrarily chosen. A higher interest rate narrows
the gap between the social allocation and the private allocation as the social planner
gives less weight to late periods when the interest rate is high. However, a change
in the interest rate does not change the relative undersupply of the two technologies,
and the main result holds7 .
5.3 Model with knowledge spillovers between the industries
Inter-industry knowledge spillovers may reduce the di¤erence in externalities from
R&D in the two technologies. Hence, the rationale for a di¤erentiated R&D policy
may diminish. To allow for inter-industry knowledge spillovers I include both of the
knowledge stocks in the R&D production functions in the following way:
_Aj = L

j (Aj + A j)
 : j = e;m; (20)
where  2 (0; 1) is the inter-industry spillover parameter. A high parameter value
implies large inter-industry spillovers, while a low value implies small inter-industry
spillovers. Figures 2a and 2b give the di¤erence between the social and the pri-
vate allocation of labor when there are knowledge spillovers between the two R&D
industries:
Figure 2a : Figure 2b
Figure 2a shows the di¤erence between the allocations when +  > 1, while Figure
2b shows the di¤erence when  +  < 1. From the gures we see that an increase
of the inter-industry spillover parameter reduces the di¤erence between the social
and the private allocation. If there are complete knowledge spillovers between the
industries, i.e.  = 1, there is no reason for the social planner to have a di¤erent
allocation ratio between the R&D industries than the private rms. However, if the
inter-industry spillovers are incomplete, i.e.  < 1, the relative undersupply of the
technologies follows from the elasticity of scale in the R&D production function.
5.4 Model with di¤erent spillover parameters across the in-
dustries
In the baseline model there are asymmetric spillovers between the industries as a
consequence of di¤erences in the knowledge stocks. Nonetheless, there may be an
additional and more direct channel for asymmetric spillovers. There are several stud-
ies that analyze di¤erences in intra-industry spillovers due to di¤erences in spillover
parameters or R&D production functions across industries (see e.g. De Bondt and
Henriques, 1995; Atallah, 2005). In this section I show simulation results where the
spillover parameter is allowed to di¤er across the two R&D industries. Figures 3a
and 3b give the di¤erence between the social and the private allocations of labor
when  may vary across industries:
Figure 3a : Figure 3b
Figure 3a shows the di¤erence between the allocations when +  > 1, while Figure
3b shows the di¤erence when  +  < 1. In both gures there is a baseline where
7Tables from sensitivity analysis can be provided by the author upon request.
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 = 0:5 in both industries. We see that if the spillover parameter is increased in
one industry, the undersupply of R&D in that industry increases. Further, we see in
Figure 3a that Lm   Lpm is negative when the spillover parameter is largest in the
emerging industry, even though the scale elasticity is larger than one. Similarly, we
see in Figure 3b that Lm   Lpm is positive when the spillover parameter is largest in
the mature industry, even though the scale elasticity is smaller than one.
In the gures, parameters are chosen so that the e¤ect of di¤erent spillover pa-
rameters can overturn the result on R&D support stemming from di¤erences in the
knowledge stocks. Nonetheless, it is not surprising that di¤erences in the spillover
parameters may change this result. By increasing the spillover parameter in one R&D
industry, knowledge spillovers are directly increased in that industry. Thus, R&D
should be supported more in that industry. A di¤erence in the spillover parameters
may pull knowledge spillovers in the same or the opposite direction as a di¤erence
in the knowledge stocks. The sum, then, determines the asymmetry of knowledge
spillovers between technologies.
6 Discussion and conclusion
An important policy question is whether R&D in new, emerging technologies should
be subsidized more than R&D in other more mature technologies. In this paper
I analyze if innovation externalities caused by knowledge spillovers may warrant a
di¤erentiation of R&D policy towards technologies of di¤erent maturity. I show that
the governmental support for R&D in emerging and mature technologies should not
be equal. The reason is that R&D in the two technologies is not equally undersupplied
in the market due to di¤erences in their knowledge stocks. Both the incentives for
rms to engage in R&D and the knowledge spillovers from R&D to future periods
change when the knowledge stock grows. Hence, the maturity of the technologies
matters when policymakers are to give socially e¢ cient subsidies to di¤erent R&D
industries.
In this paper the elasticity of scale in the R&D production function determines
whether an emerging technology or a mature technology is more undersupplied in the
market. The reason is that the output elasticities determine the knowledge spillovers
through two opposing e¤ects. First, the spillovers are increasing in the knowledge
stock because the labor input is large in late periods due to high labor productivity.
Second, the spillovers are declining in the knowledge stock because there is less
productivity gain from new patents when the technology is mature.
I show that the emerging technology is more undersupplied and should be subsi-
dized more than the mature technology when the elasticity of scale is smaller than
one. However, when the elasticity of scale is larger than one the mature R&D indus-
try should be subsidized more. There are some studies that estimate the parameters
in the aggregate R&D production function. Both Porter and Stern (2000) and Pessoa
(2005) nd a scale elasticity larger than one. In another study, Gong et al. (2004)
nd a scale elasticity smaller than one, though the results are not signicant. An-
other approach is Jones and Williams (2000), where the calibrated ranges of output
elasticities all give an elasticity of scale larger than one. In sum, these studies indicate
that the scale elasticity is larger than one. In this case, it is not a valid argument to
support R&D in new (clean) technologies more than other R&D on the basis that
new (clean) technologies are less mature.
However, there are several caveats to this conclusion. First, the empirical litera-
ture on output elasticities in the R&D production function is not very well developed.
Further research is needed to establish signicant ranges for the output elasticities.
Moreover, in a recent empirical study Dechezlepretre et al. (2013) nd that spillovers
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are larger in clean than dirty technologies. The driving force behind the result may be
that clean technologies are newer technologies than dirty. This points in the direction
of an elasticity of scale larger than one. However, their estimation of the di¤erence
in spillovers across industries may be confounded with other e¤ects than technology
maturity. For instance, the output elasticity parameters may not be the same across
R&D industries. As shown in Section 5.4, di¤erent spillover parameters across R&D
industries give an additional e¤ect on the asymmetry of knowledge spillovers between
technologies.
Second, the result is calculated under an assumption of symmetric technologies
from the demand side. It may be natural to think that new technologies are of better
quality while there is a larger market for the mature technology. The price (quality)
e¤ect and the market size e¤ect will then inuence the direction of technological
change (Acemoglu, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2012). However, these e¤ects are only
relevant for optimal R&D policy if they a¤ect the R&D rmsability to appropriate
the value of the innovation. The implicit assumption in this paper is that the surplus
appropriability problem is equal for the two technologies. If this were not the case,
the appropriability problem would be a separate rationale for a di¤erentiated R&D
policy, in addition to the knowledge spillovers analyzed in this paper. In a model
with asymmetric technology demand, a new technology with higher quality (lower
price) would induce a positive price e¤ect and direct R&D towards that sector. On
the other hand, if the other, mature technology has a large market, this would pull
R&D in the direction of mature technology. The relative strength of these e¤ects
would depend on substitution elasticities between the technologies in the nal goods
production and on the relative size of the knowledge stocks, i.e. the maturity. In other
words, the pull from the demand side would partly be driven by the maturity of the
technologies. However, it is not clear from the literature on directed technical change
what e¤ect the direction of R&D has on optimal R&D policy. In a future research
project it might be interesting to further analyze the link between the direction of
technical change and the surplus appropriation problem.
Third, related to the demand side of the technology markets and the appropri-
ability problem, this paper assumes that there are no externalities from the use of
the technologies. This may be a too strong assumption for analyzing real-world inno-
vation policies. For instance, emerging technologies may be clean and environmental
friendly while mature technologies may be dirty with emissions. If these emissions
are not internalized, it would ceteris paribus be optimal to subsidize emerging R&D
more than mature. However, this would be the second-best solution. The rst-best
solution with more than one policy tool would be to target each market failure by
separate policies. The optimal environmental policy would be to set the Pigouvian
tax on emissions, and, thus, provide e¢ cient demand for the clean technology. In
this case, the remaining innovation market failure would be the one stemming from
knowledge spillovers, if the surplus appropriation problem is symmetric between tech-
nologies. It may be, though, that there is a correspondence between the tax level
of emissions, the demand for a technology, and the surplus appropriation problem.
This is a venue for future research.
Fourth, this paper assumes that there are no other externalities on the supply
side of technology markets than those related to knowledge spillovers. This may
also be a too strong assumption for analyzing real-world innovation policies. For
instance, there is recent literature showing that nancial frictions hamper innova-
tion (see e.g. Brown et al., 2012). Financially constrained rms may invest too
little in innovation compared to the socially optimal level. This problem is maybe
more relevant for R&D rms in new, emerging industries than for rms in mature
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industries with deeper pockets. In this case, it would be optimal to support R&D on
emerging technologies more, if it is not viable to target the nancial frictions directly.
The interaction between nancial frictions and innovation externalities is interesting
to explore further. Similarly, the relationship between the relative undersupply of
technologies and project riskwhere investments in new technologies may be more
riskyis another interesting venue for future research (see e.g. Matsumura, 2003;
Atallah, 2014). This paper, however, sheds light on whether knowledge spillovers, in
isolation from other e¤ects, can be a rationale for a di¤erentiated R&D policy for
technologies of di¤erent maturity.
Appendix
Appendix A - The equality of patent prices
Free entry ensures that the price of a patent is equal to the present discounted value of
the prots for an intermediate goods rm, Pj = PDVj : j 2 e;m. The instantaneous
prot for an intermediate goods rms is given by:
i = (1  )L1 Y xi ; (21)
where (7) is inserted in (9). Integrating (21) on both sides over the total knowledge
stock A gives
Ai = (1  )L1 Y
R A
0
xi di
()
 = (1  )YA ;
(22)
where I have inserted from (5). Then PDV is equal across all intermediate goods
rms and can be written as
PDVt =
Z 1
t
e rz(1  )Y (z)
A(z)
dz: (23)
Appendix B - The (simplied) socially optimal equilibrium
The autonomous Hamiltonian H is given from the simple, partial social planner
problem:
H(Ae; Am; e; m; Lm) = Am +Ae + mvL

mA

m + ev(1  Lm)Ae ;
The necessary conditions are given by the rst order condition
@H()
@Lm
: mvL
 1
m A

m   ev(1  Lm) 1Ae = 0; (24)
the development of the shadow values from the co-state equations
_m = mr   mvLmA 1m   1 (25)
_e = er   ev(1  Lm)A 1e   1; (26)
and the transversality conditions
lim
t!1me
 rtAm = 0
lim
t!1ee
 rtAe = 0:
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The su¢ cient conditions are satised by the necessary conditions together with that
the Hamiltonian is concave in [Lm; Am; Ae] (Mangasarians theorem).
I rearrange (24) to get the social allocation ratio
1  Lm
Lm
= (
e
m
)1=(1 )(
Ae
Am
)=(1 ): (27)
Inserting _Am and _Ae in equation (27) the social allocation ratio is given by
1  Lm
Lm
=
e _Ae
m _Am
:
Appendix C - The full socially optimal equilibrium
In the full social planner problem, resources are allocated to nal goods production as
well as to R&D in the emerging and the mature technology, i.e. Lt = LY;t+Le;t+Lm;t.
In per capita terms we have k = KL and y =
Y
L , and the nal goods production can
be written y = A1 k(1  sm   se)1 , where sm = LmL and se = LeL .
Discounted utility is given by Ut =
R1
t
Lsu(cs)e
 r(s t)ds, where Lt = L0ent, n is
the population growth rate, and u(ct) is the instant utility of consumption per capita
c = CL . The nal goods are converted into consumption goods or capital goods in a
one-to-one ratio so that capital per capita grows according to _k = y   c  (n + )k,
where  is the depreciation rate of capital.
The appropriate social planner problem is
max
c;sm;se
:
Z 1
t
L0u(c)e
 tdt
s:t: _k = y   c  (n+ )k
_Am = s

mL
Am
_Ae = s

eL
Ae ;
given L0, K0, Am;0, Ae;0, where  = r   n. From the rst order conditions of this
problem it is readily shown that
se
sm
=
e _Ae
m _Am
;
which basically is the same resource allocation rule as in the main text, equation
(13), where se = 1  sm when I disregard the allocation to nal goods production,
and sm = L

m when Le + Lm = 1.
Appendix D - Calculation of the shadow values
I rewrite the equations given by (16):
_j + jfj(t) =  1 : j = m; e; (28)
where fj(t) = 
_Aj
Aj   r. I suppress j = m; e in the following and dene F (t) =R
f(t)dt =
R

_A
Adt +
R
rdt =
R
dAA +
R
rdt =  lnA   rt. I multiply both sides of
(28) by eF (t) and derive with respect to time to get
@
@t (e
F (t)) =  eF (t)
=)
eF (t) =
R t
1 eF (z)dz + C;
(29)
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where C is a constant. Inserting for eF (t) = Ae rt, (29) can be written
 = A ert(C  
Z t
1
Ae rzdz): (30)
We can nd the value of C by using the balanced growth rate and the transversal-
ity condition. First, I expand (30) by using
R
Ae rtdt =   1rAe rt+
R

r
_A
AA
e rtdt:
 = A ertC +
1
r
 A ert
Z t
1

r
_A
A
Ae rzdz: (31)
It is well known that in a Jones-type model the growth rate on the balanced growth
path (bgp) is given by gA = n(1 ) . In the current model n = 0 and limt!1
_A
A = 0,
i.e. the bgp is reached asymptotically and the growth rate is _AA = 0. Using this
implies that on the bgp, (31) simplies to
 = A ertC +
1
r
: (32)
Lastly I utilize the transversality condition, limt!1 e rtA = 0. By substituting for
 = A ertC + 1r in the transversality condition I get
lim
t!1A
1 C +
e rtA
r
= 0; (33)
which is only valid for C = 0. Inserting for C = 0 in (32) I get that on bgp the
shadow values of patents are equal for both technologies j = m; e and is given by
 =
1
r
: (34)
I get the shadow values outside the balanced growth path by inserting C = 0 in
equation (30):
 = A ert
Z 1
t
Ae rzdz: (35)
Appendix E - E¤ects on the Hamiltonian of perturbating Lpm
Following Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, pp. 221), let  be a point in time  2 [t;1).
Then I dene a perturbation of Lpm as a replacement of L
p
m by the constant Lm
on some interval E(s) = [ ;  + s). Further, the value of the Hamiltonian for a
perturbation of Lpm to the right of  is dened as W (s). If s = 0, then we are at time
 where Lpm is not perturbated and W (0) is given by H(Ae; Am; e; m; L
p
m), where
H() is the Hamiltonian (see Appendix B). Then the social gain of perturbating from
Lpm for any  is given by
dW (0)
ds = H(Ae; Am; e; m;
Lm) H(Ae; Am; e; m; Lpm) ? 0
)
m(Lm)
Am + e(1  Lm)Ae   m(Lpm)Am   e(1  Lpm)Ae ? 0;
(36)
where Ae, Am, e and m follow from L
p
m. If (36) has a derivative with respect to Lm
in the neighborhood of Lpm that is positive (negative), it follows that
dW (0)
ds is positive
(negative) if Lm is slightly larger than Lpm. Thus, it is optimal to increase (decrease)
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Lpm with a small integer if the derivative is positive (negative). The derivative of (36)
with respect to Lm in the neighborhood of Lpm is given by
m(L
p
m)
 1Am   e(1  Lpm) 1Ae ? 0: (37)
I use equations (12) and (18) to insert for Lpm, e and m in (37):
A m
R1
t
[Am(z)]
e rzdz
A e
R1
t
[Ae(z)]e rzdz
  1 ? 0: (38)
If the left hand side of (38) is negative (positive), then the derivative of (36) is
negative (positive) and it follows that the social allocation to the emerging R&D
industry is larger (smaller) than the private allocation.
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